


February 23, 2024

## LatAm FX: Gauging The Risks & Rewards

- Tail risks for Latin America revolve around geopolitics, along with energy costs, El Nino weather, climate change, high global interest rates, and constraints on both fiscal and monetary policies.
- The region has suffered significantly in the post-pandemic recovery; dependence on China demand and commodities are part of the problem.
- Political risks have also been notable, but the 2023 trend to vote out incumbents in favor of anti-establishment candidates, e.g., in Argentina (and in Guatemala), is not expected to continue.
- FX volatility has fallen even as the USD as climbed and proven to be a constraint on faster easing of policy. The carry trade is intact but positioning and other risks require some premium to keep investors content.

The political risks for the region are captured in the Economic Policy Uncertainty index and show that 2024 is expected to have more risk than 2023, but far less than in more tumultuous times. This is important to consider – particularly when you look at the nations most at risk by this measure vs. the elections ahead. Brazil may be a current favorite for investors but remains at risk for political and economic policy noise that could surprise. The growth vs. social inequality risks across the region show clearly and may be a good place to start understanding the post-pandemic uncertainty. The GINI coefficient measures the income inequality of a nation – both the US and China are below 40 but all of LatAm higher. GDP is important as a counter to inequality in politics, as the social mobility of a nation matters significantly to politics.

**GDP & Economic Inequality Drive LatAm Politics**



Source: World Bank, BNY Mellon

Investors continue to point to political risks across the region as an impediment to larger investment flows. While many see Mexico's June 2 election as key, the ongoing debate in Brazil about fiscal rules seems more important to actual growth and risk. The rest of the region has 'neighborhood' woes, with the Venezuela/Guyana oil fields conflict adding to Colombia troubles, and Ecuador violence along with Uruguay's version posing troubles for Argentina and Brazil. Violence and rule of law is a rising issue in 2024. Ecuador, long an anchor of stability in the region, has experienced a surge in violence caused by Narcos gangs. For Colombia, 2024 will be decisive as regards President Gustavo Petro's 'total peace' plan. Uruguay is now also requesting international support to fight gang violence. The relationship of the region to China vs. the US continues to be a divide, with the shift of Argentina notable. Dependence on food production and other commodities leaves the region sharply divided economically, with polarized politics and policies.

- **In Brazil**, the fiscal story is central. The Lula government has given key sectors another year of special benefits reduction payroll taxes, putting the fiscal deficit back at risk. The central bank has been patient and supported growth with early rate cuts. The Selic benchmark rate stands at 11.25%. Markets price it to fall to 9.5% by the end of the cycle. Inflation is forecast to ease to 3.9% by the end of the year, according to a Bloomberg survey. Price pressures are expected to stay low, with the inflation breakeven rate implied by 3y bonds at 4.44%, near a three-year low. This seems optimistic considering the political risk around the deficit and the BRL.
- **In Mexico**, recent protests against AMLO seem limited in their impact on the June election outcome, but congressional approval of reforms may be

problematic. Polls show Sheinbaum at 65% support and Galvez at 30% – need something more to change the risk here. Mid-February CPI at 4.45% y/y – down from 4.9% y/y – was sufficient to spark further talk of Banxico cutting in March. The slowdown in Q4 GDP to 0.1% q/q adds to the political pressure on Banxico. Expectations for 100bp of cuts in 2024 are priced.

- **In Argentina**, new President Milei has shifted from an “omnibus bill” to fix the fiscal situation to one where measures by decree attempt to right the deficits. The Chamber of Deputies is seen as a key block to faster reforms – leaving the risk of persistently high inflation. Rates at 100% and inflation over 250% leave no room for normalization until fiscal resolution. ARS and local assets remain out of liquidity focus for most investors, with IMF negotiations critical for getting a path towards re-entry into global capital markets.
- **In Colombia**, political risks are increasing as President Petro seems set to intervene more aggressively in the economy. Red tape from new regulations around the economy and uncertain tax risks may stall investments. The power of Petro on fiscal spending may mean a rise to levels that provoke larger opposition. This risk doesn't yet appear priced or in the economic uncertainty index. The central bank started modest rate cuts in January, -25bp to 12.75%. Forecasts are for more but with CPI expected at 5.7% and GDP at 1%, along with the difficult politics, the speed of change for rates is more dependent on COP, which broke some of its oil linkage from 2023. Only if oil squeezes over \$85/bbl will that likely matter again.
- **In Chile**, the new Minister of Finance Marcel announced plans for taxpayer compliance. At the same time, the PGU (guaranteed universal pensions) seeks 1.5% of GDP – with overall tax increases of 2.7% of GDP if approved. This will dominate the debate to May, even with the PGU effective since December. Growth risks from tax hikes will be watched by investors. The central bank left rates at 8.25% in January – FX is clearly a factor in holding back, even with CPI falling below 5%. The market has backed away from more aggressive easing, with risk of 6.5% by year-end.
- **In Peru**, the cabinet changes are seen as noise and unlikely to succeed in shifting President Boluarte's low approval, stuck below 10%, with an 85% disapproval rating seen as linked to the recession. Peru's central bank has always intervened in markets, as the country's economy is highly polarized, and many citizens and companies have dollar-denominated debt with local banks. FX swaps and the sale of USD in the spot market have been the preferred method used by officials, especially near the close of each session, which indicates an intention to impact pricing. This last week was no different and likely puts pressure on PEN short positions, likely keeping the 3.80-3.90 zone open for further intervention.

## Economic Uncertainty Modest For The Region

### Geopolitical risk index


Measured by % of news articles, bubble size indicates the z-score  
Source: Economic Policy Uncertainty



Source: Macrobond, Economic Uncertainty Index, BNY Mellon


LatAm central banks have added to growth woes with higher real rates after the pandemic spending and the push higher in global rates. Most of the central banks are dovish but reluctant to cut faster with FX the key barometer. In the next two years, the outlook for growth is best in Chile, Colombia and Argentina, while Mexico, Peru and Brazil are expected to continue to slow. Growth in all is well below the 2021 post-pandemic highs. The carry trade that dominated 2023 led to outsized positions in MXN, BRL and COP being unwound in Q4, but the revival in carry in February stands out as a key factor for understanding 2024 risks.

## GDP Has Not Recovered From Post-Pandemic Bounces




Source: World Bank, BNY Mellon

Options volatility in LatAm FX has been calm – the drop in 1m volatility has been significant and a factor driving the “carry trade” in the region despite uncertainty around both monetary and fiscal policies. Some of this reflects central bank action and policy, and some the broader drop in FX implied volatility. That currencies in the entire region have lost ground against the USD is both a reflection of the overall broad dollar strength coupled with the hangover of carry-trade positions from 2023.



Source: iFlow, BNY Mellon



20d Flows, Holdings,  
and Profitability



Clouds: distributions over trailing 1,000 days

Sources: Bank of New York Mellon, WM/Refinitiv

Data as of

2024-02-21

Source: iFlow, BNY Mellon

**Bottom Line:** Investment flows into LatAm are balanced between political risks and the carry trade. This leaves economic uncertainty high – and risks higher than

rewards in some of the region. The current iFlow LatAm cloud (above) seems to reflect all of these factors, indicating only PEN and CLP as likely movers in the weeks ahead. The leadership of BRL and MXN in the LatAm carry trade may well continue, but likely pivots on political risks and the speed of future rate cuts.

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